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The Internal Market and National Security: 
Transposition, Impact, and Reform of the EU Directive on 
Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products 
 
MARTIN TRYBUS* and LUKE R. A. BUTLER** 
 
Abstract 
Whilst the Internal Market has been operational for decades, the free movement of defence 
products within the EU has been restricted by national licencing practices. Member States 
have treated “intra-EU” transfers as equivalent to third country exports. The Intra-
Community Transfers Directive (ICT) introduced a harmonised transfer regime. This article 
provides a first legal analysis and a case study of the challenges facing harmonisation where 
an evolving Internal Market competence meets a diversity of national security and other 
interests. The ICT constitutes a significant first step towards reducing barriers to trade but 
an ambivalent approach to minimum harmonisation has impacted its effectiveness; legal 
reform is required to further this objective. 
 
1. Introduction  
Member States have historically restricted the free movement of defence products within the 
EU. Law and practice in this field appears to operate in a parallel universe in which the 
Internal Market does not exist. National licencing laws and policies have treated ‘intra-
Union’ transfers, that is, the transmission or movement of a defence-related product from a 
supplier in one Member State to a recipient in another,1 as equivalent to exports to third 
countries outside the EU. A principal concern is that the absence of controls on transfers 
within the EU could exacerbate risks of illicit exports outside the EU, threatening national 
security and foreign policy. Disproportionate licencing requirements have incurred significant 
costs and delays, creating barriers to trade. However, in 2009, the EU adopted its “Defence 
Package”, a key component of which is the Intra-Community Transfers Directive (ICT) 
2009/43/EC introducing a harmonised transfer licencing and certification regime.2  
 This article addresses an important gap in existing literature by offering a legal 
analysis of the ICT.3 It also argues that recent proposals for further harmonisation through 
*University of Birmingham. **University of Bristol. Thanks to Phil Syrpis and Albert Sánchez Graells, 
Anthony Arnull, Baudouin Heuninckx, and participants at the 46th UACES Conference in Bilbao, September 
2015, for comments on a previous version of this article. Any mistakes, however, are ours. 
1 Based on the definition of ‘transfer’ in Article 3(2) Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the 
Community [2009] OJ L146/1. Post-Lisbon, ‘Union’ should be substituted for ‘Community’. 
2 The “Defence Package” consists of: the ICT; Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply 
contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security; and 
amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC [2009] OJ L216/76 and A Strategy for a Stronger and More 
Competitive European Defence Industry COM (2007)764 final. See Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in 
Europe: the EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive in Context (CUP, Cambridge 2014); and 
Heuninckx, “The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: Trick or Treat?” (2011) 20 PPL Rev 9. For 
an overview of the ICT in a legal context, see Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe, ibid., at 139-156. 
3 For the political science/security studies literature, see Masson, Marta, Léger and Lundmark, “The “Transfer 
Directive”: perceptions in European countries and recommendations”, Fondation pour la reserche stratégique, 
No. 04/2010; Mölling, “Options for an EU regime on intra-Community transfers of defence goods” in Keohane 
(ed.), Towards a European Defence Market, Chaillot Paper 113 (EU Institute of Security Studies: Paris, 2008) 
and Ingels, “The Intra-EU Defence Trade Directive: Positive Goals” in Bailes, Depauw and Baum (eds.) The EU 
Defence Market: Balancing Effectiveness with Responsibility (Flemish Peace Institute: Brussels, 2011).  
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“soft-law” Recommendations are insufficient and that legal reform of the ICT is necessary to 
enable minimum harmonisation. This argument is made in light of a recent Commission-
authorised study tasked to assess the ICT’ impact, which concluded that, whilst widespread 
variable implementation has limited the Directive’s impact in practice, there is no strong 
interest among authorities and industry for legal reform and that further harmonisation should 
be pursued through soft-law guidance. 4  In late 2016, the Commission published a 
Communication based largely on this study adopting two Recommendations for further 
harmonisation which do not, however, entail legal reform. 5 This article begins by examining 
transfers in their historical economic, political and legal context (Section 2). 6  It then analyses 
the ICT’s scope (Section 3), transfers and licences (Section 4), end-use controls (Section 5), 
and certification (Section 6)7 before offering conclusions (Section 7).  
 
2. Context 
The defence industries of several EU Member States are part of a global armaments market in 
which, in 2014, the top 100 defence producers sold goods and services worth US$401 
billion.8 Companies in the so-called ‘Big Six’ Member States, namely France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK, sell to their respective governments, to a lesser extent to 
other Member States, and export to third countries.9 Further, most Member States have at 
least niche capacities and participate in European and global supply chains. Therefore, the 
4 Commission, Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC on the Transfers of Defence-Related Products within the 
Community Final Report (prepared by Technopolis) June 2016 (published 7 October 2016) (hereinafter 
‘Technopolis’), in particular, at 73. The authors were interviewed for this Report: Appendix E, 102, Table 39.  
5  See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Evaluation of Directive 
2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of 
transfers of defence-related products within the Community COM(2016) 760 final (30.11.2016); Commission 
Recommendation of 30.11.2016 on the harmonisation of the scope and conditions for general transfer licences 
for armed forces and contracting authorities as referred to in point (a) of Article 5(2) of Directive 2009/43/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council C(2016) 7711 final; and Commission Recommendation of 
30.11.2016 on the harmonisation of the scope of and conditions for general transfer licences for certified 
recipients as referred to in Article 9 of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
C(2016) 7728 final. The Commission Staff Working Document SWD(2016) 398 final/2 (7.12.2016) 
accompanying COM(2016) 760 final does not go beyond the findings of Technoloplis, ibid.      
6  Drawing on: UNISYS, ‘Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products’, Final Report of the Study 
‘Assessment of Community initiatives related to intra-community transfers of defence products’, Brussels, 
February 2005 (for the European Commission) (hereinafter ‘UNISYS’) (no longer publicly available but retained 
on file); and Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related 
products within the Community (hereinafter ‘Impact Assessment’), SEC(2007), 1593. 
7 Informed by Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition of 
Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products within the EU, 
COM(2012) 359 final (hereinafter ‘Transposition Report’); Mampaey, Moreau, Quéau and Seniora, Final 
Report, Study on the Implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC on Transfers of Defence-related Products, Group 
for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) (prepared for the European Commission) 2014; 
European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies Policy Department’s Report – The impact of the 
‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence 2015; Technopolis, supra note 4, and SWD(2016) 398 
final/2. Information was also collected during semi-structured interviews conducted with Mr Ian Bendelow, UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and informal discussions with German officials.  
8  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Press Release, 14 December 2014: 
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/SIPRI-Top-100-December-2014 [last visited 30 January 2017]. 
The list contains many EU-based companies. The European defence industries have an estimated annual 
turnover of €55 billion and employ approximately 300,000 people. See also 2007 figures in COM (2007)764 
supra note 2, at 2, also indicating that 20 years ago these figures were almost twice as high. 
9 For a discussion of this grouping, see Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 26. 
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ability to transfer defence products expeditiously with proportionate controls is an important 
contributor to the competitiveness and, indeed, survival of the European defence industries.  
 
2.1. The status quo ante: intra-Union transfers prior to the ICT 
For many years, the Commission has sought to prioritise intra-Union transfers as part of the 
development of a more competitive EU defence market. 10  However, there had been no 
general EU-wide regime for the intra-Union transfer of defence-related products.11 Member 
States instituted their own national laws and policies, which formally treated intra-EU 
transfers and third country exports without distinction.12 National ex ante export licences 
would be required in both instances.13 To this extent, national rules were not specifically 
adapted to differentiate Internal Market law obligations and any other legal obligations with 
regard to exports. Thus, measures that might otherwise be appropriate for export risks, such 
as potential diversion to third parties involved in conflict or terrorism, were equally applied to 
transfers to allied and generally peaceful Member States within an integrated EU. This 
absence of free movement was criticised not least by the European defence industries.14 
 Whilst licence applications for export to other EU or NATO members were most 
likely subject to less scrutiny than exports to other countries,15 the formal existence of many 
different laws was, in itself, “a serious burden for intra-[Union] transfers” exacerbated by 
their publication alongside licencing policies (if published) in different languages.16 Further, 
Member States used different national and international lists for the control of armaments to 
determine the scope of coverage of licences.17 Most national laws did not specify detailed or 
transparent licencing criteria.18 Determinations were, therefore, at the absolute discretion of 
licencing authorities.19 Moreover, certain national laws required that additional (pre-)licences 
be obtained or a fee paid before licences could be approved.20 The processes for certifying 
reliable defence companies also varied.21 Finally, licences could be obtained for several years 
covering multiple shipments or required for every single shipment.22 Time limits for licence 
expirations also varied.23  Resulting administrative burdens generated long lead times up to 
several months.24 Even companies transferring components between subsidiaries located in 
several countries had to comply with variable regimes.25 It is difficult to assess the indirect 
costs of controls on the defence industries overall, but the direct costs amount to hundreds of 
millions of Euros.26 These costs are stark considering that in 2003, out of 12,627 licence 
10 COM(1996) 10 final, at 19; COM(1997) 583 final, Annex I, Art.5; Annex II; and COM(2003) 113 final, at 13.  
11 By contrast, see Council Regulation 428/2009/EC setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (recast) [2009] OJ L134/1. 
12 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 4 and most recently COM(2016) 760 final, at 3. 
13 UNISYS, supra note 6, at 12; Impact Assessment, ibid., at 13. 
14 See the President of the European Defence Industries Group Corrado Antonini: “Political Harmonisation and 
Consolidation”, EMP conference on the Future of the European Defence Industry, Brussels, 10-11 December 
2003 as cited in UNISYS, ibid., at 80. 
15 Masson, Marta, Léger, and Lundmark, ‘The “Transfer Directive”’, supra note 3, at 18. For a useful analysis of 
national licencing regimes prior to the ICT, see ibid 15-32 and UNISYS, supra note 6, at 8-36 and Annex D. 
16 UNISYS, ibid., at 12 also at 59 and 64. 
17 UNISYS, supra note 6, at 9. See also: Mölling, supra note 3, at 58. 
18 UNISYS, ibid., at 61. 
19 Impact Assessment, note 6, at 14. 
20 UNISYS, supra note 6, at 61; Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 14. 
21 Mölling, supra note 3, at 59. 
22 UNISYS, supra note 6, at 62. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., at 5; Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 14 and Mölling, supra note 3, at 61-62, 68. 
25 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 4. 
26 UNISYS, supra note 6, at 112 estimates the indirect costs at €2.73 billion. The estimated direct costs for the 
12,627 licence procedures conducted in 2003 amounted to €238 million (ibid.).  
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applications,27 only 15 were refused, all in the Baltic States.28 Whilst, as will be discussed in 
Section 4, licencing measures may exceptionally be justified, the above indicates that 
licencing practices have generally been disproportionate to control needs.29  
Some momentum towards liberalisation resulted from the 1998 intergovernmental 
Letter of Intent (LoI) initiative, to which the ‘Big-Six’ defence industrial Member States are 
currently signatories.30 Attempts had been made to introduce the ‘Global Project Licence’ 
removing the need for specific authorisations to transfer products between LoI partners 
participating in collaborative projects. 31  However, the LoI initiative has not been fully 
executed in practice and with limited results to date. 32  In 2006, the EU launched a 
Consultation Paper on intra-Community transfers. 33  This precipitated the 2007 Impact 
Assessment34 and proposal for a Directive.35 The status quo was rejected. The Commission 
opted for a Directive rather than a Regulation based on the “primary responsibility” of 
Member States for simplification of licencing and the general sensitivity of defence.36 On 6 
May 2009, the ICT was adopted. Member States had until 30 June 2011 for transposition: 
Article 18(1) ICT. However, national provisions did not have to enter into effect until 30 June 
2012, allowing a period in which to “foster mutual trust” and evaluate progress based on a 
Commission report. 37  In 2012, the Commission reported incomplete transposition 38  and 
initially launched infringement proceedings against seven Member States.39 However, despite 
these delays, all Member States have now formally transposed the ICT.40  
 
2.2. Competence to regulate armaments and harmonisation under the TFEU 
As transfers of defence products may implicate national security and foreign policy, central 
issues are the EU’s competence to act and the nature and scope of harmonisation in this field. 
 
2.2.1. Competence 
The ICT was adopted under Article 114 TFEU (then 95 EC) which enables EU legislation 
that harmonises relevant national laws for the establishment and functioning of the Internal 
Market.41 Harmonisation is conventionally understood as the institution of common EU rules 
to remove ‘lawful’ barriers to trade, that is, nationally diverse measures which are prima facie 
incompatible with the TFEU but which could exceptionally be justified e.g. on public health 
27 With an overall value of €8.9 billion for conventional defence products delivered between the then 25 EU 
Member States: UNISYS, supra note 6, at 94. This represents approximately 31.4 per cent of all transfers, with 
the remainder being exports to third countries: ibid., 95.  
28 UNISYS, ibid., at 94: six in Estonia, six in Latvia and three in Lithuania. 
29 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 4 and 13.  
30 Letter of Intent between the Defence Ministers of the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden on 
Measures to facilitate the Restructuring of the European Defence Industry signed in London, 6 July 1998. The 
LoI was formalised under a Framework Agreement (FA) which entered into force on 2 October 2003. For a 
general discussion of the LoI, see Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 225-231.  
31 Article 7 LoI FA. 
32 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 9 and 18. 
33 Commission, Consultation Paper on the Intra-Community Circulation of Products for the Defence of Member 
States, 21 March 2006, Brussels, ENTR/C. 
34 Supra note 6. 
35 Proposal, COM(2007) 765 final. 
36 COM(2007) 765 final, at 8. 
37 See Recital 40 and Articles 17(1) and 18(1) ICT. 
38  The Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 15-19 reported in 2012 that 20 Member States had fully 
transposed, one had partially, six were expectant and one had not communicated transposition. 
39 Transposition Report, ibid, at 5. 
40 See: COM(2016) 760 final, at 2 and SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 14. Croatia joined the EU only in 2013.  
41 Preamble and Recital 43 ICT.  
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or security grounds.42 If a harmonisation Directive is enacted to provide rules which protect 
such interests, recourse to such grounds is precluded.43 If harmonisation is not complete, 
however, Member States may continue to have recourse to those grounds.44  
 It is clear that defence-related products are goods for the purposes of EU law. 45 
Onerous licencing requirements may constitute measures having equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions on exports contrary to Article 35 TFEU. 46  The ICT considers 
harmonisation to be necessary because “direct” application of the free movement principles 
alone is insufficient to remove national restrictions in light of their potential to be justified 
under Article 36 or 346 TFEU.47 In other words, the ICT recognises the reality that licencing 
measures remain, in principle, justifiable on public security and/or essential national security 
grounds in exceptional circumstances.48 However, it seeks to progressively eliminate certain 
licencing measures which do not justify exclusion from EU Internal Market principles 
through a uniform minimum EU licencing regime. This does not preclude Member States 
from continuing to rely on exceptions within the ICT which limit its application based on 
such security grounds, Article 36 TFEU to deviate from the ICT, or exempt other national 
licencing measures from free movement principles under Internal Market law. Nor does it 
preclude derogation from the TFEU altogether pursuant to Article 346 TFEU. This provides a 
degree of flexibility necessary to balance sensitive security interests against the discipline of 
the Internal Market. The onus is now firmly on Member States to justify why those interests 
cannot be sufficiently protected within the scope of the ICT, which properly acknowledges 
the application of free movement principles to licencing of defence products. 
However, outstanding questions remain. Firstly, whilst the ICT indicates that 
licencing measures have the “potential” to be justified, prior CJEU case law had not provided 
a clear indication as to what kinds of measure can be justified under Article 36 TFEU and the 
level of scrutiny to be applied. It is, perhaps, surprising that Member States and suppliers 
have not previously challenged the compatibility of national licencing measures with EU law 
on this basis. So far, EU case law has only indicated that licencing measures applicable to the 
import, export and transit of dual-use goods could be justified on grounds of public 
security.49 Secondly, the fact that, unusually, the ICT seeks to harmonise national measures 
justified not only under Article 36 TFEU within the scope of the Treaty but also under Article 
346 TFEU outside the Treaty altogether, raises questions as to the form and level of judicial 
scrutiny that will be applied by the EU courts to national licencing measures taken under 
Article 346 TFEU. Prior to the ICT, Member States considered that measures concerning 
armaments, including licencing in relation to transfers, were automatically and categorically 
excluded from the TFEU under Article 346 TFEU50 on the basis that such measures affect 
Member States’ essential security interests. 51  The justifiability of those measures under 
42 Alternatively, on the basis of the ‘Cassis de Dijon’ mandatory requirements or overriding public interest 
grounds as recognised in REWE Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Case 120/78) 
[1979] ECR 649, [1979] 3 CMLR 494 and subsequent case law.  
43 Commission v. Ireland, (‘Campus Oil’) (Case 72/83) [1984] ECR 2727, para.21. 
44 Denkavit Futtermittel GmbH v. Land Baden-Württemberg (C-39/90) [1991] ECR I-3069, para.19. 
45 Recital 2 ICT. See also Commission v. Italy (‘Arts Treasures’) (Case 7/68) [1968] ECR 423, 429.  
46 Consultation Paper, supra note 33, at 3 and COM(2007) 765 final supra note 35, at 19.   
47 Recitals 2 and 5 ICT. 
48 Recitals 5, 13 and Article 1(3) ICT.  
49 Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC (C-367/89) [1991] ECR 
I-4621; Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v. Germany (C-70/94) [1995] ECR I-3989 and Criminal 
Proceedings against Peter Leifer (C-83/94) [1995] ECR I-3231.  
50 Whilst difficult to empirically validate, this assessment was made by UNISYS, supra note 6, at 70-72 and the 
Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 19.  
51 Article 346(1)(b) TFEU: “[…] any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, 
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Article 36 TFEU does not appear to have been fully addressed. In the related field of defence 
procurement, the CJEU continues to refine its general interpretation that Article 346 TFEU 
does not represent an automatic or categorical exclusion of trade in defence products from the 
otherwise applicable TFEU.52 Similar to the free movement exceptions such as Article 36 
TFEU, Article 346 TFEU is subject to a narrow interpretation. 53  Member States must 
specifically invoke Article 346 TFEU and prove that a situation justifying its use exists. In 
the Commission’s view, it is not possible to infer from Article 346 TFEU a general proviso 
inherent in the TFEU covering all measures taken by Member States and that it has no effect 
on its legislative power to adopt harmonising legislation concerning defence product 
transfers.54 Notwithstanding, this leaves unresolved the issue of the extent of deference to be 
shown by the EU courts to national licencing measures which are prima facie incompatible 
with the ICT in light of this politically sensitive context. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this 
article to address these questions of EU constitutional law, they further expose longstanding 
uncertainty regarding the proper relationship between Article 36 and 346 TFEU.  
 In any event, it is questionable whether the legal basis for harmonisation or the 
compatibility of the ICT with the TFEU would be challenged. Member States have not 
signalled any indication that the ICT is an encroachment on their competences. Further, the 
choice of a Directive is consistent with EU legal approaches to licencing and transfers in 
related areas e.g. firearms and explosives for civil use.55 The ICT also mirrors calls for action 
to regulate transfers of dual-use goods i.e. goods for military and civil purposes. A EU dual-
use Regulation establishes a common set of EU rules for the export of dual-use goods but 
which has been criticised because it continues to enable Member States to impose restrictive 
controls on intra-EU transfers of dual-use goods; the ICT is identified as a potential model on 
which to base future harmonisation.56 On balance, it is better to have a Directive that uses EU 
measures to reduce the effect of lawful restrictions than leave restrictive national measures in 
munitions and war material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the 
internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes […]” In 1958, the 
Council compiled a list of armaments to which Article 346(1)(b) TFEU applies. See Council-Decision 298/58 of 
15 April 1958 (not published). On Article 346 TFEU: Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe, supra 
note 2, at 87-128; Koutrakos, “The Application of EC law to Defence Industries—Changing Interpretations of 
Article 296 EC” in Barnard and Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart: Oxford, 2009), 
at 307-328 and Pourbaix, “The Future Scope of Application of Article 346 TFEU” (2011) 20 PPL Rev 1-8. 
52 Commission v. Spain (C-414/97) [1999] ECR I-5585, [2000] 2 CMLR 4. This interpretation was reiterated in 
Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of 
defence procurement’ (Communication) COM(2006) 779 final. This position has been confirmed and further 
refined in subsequent judgments: Agusta judgments (Commission v. Italy (C-337/05) [2008] ECR I-2173 and 
Commission v. Italy (C-157/06) [2008] ECR I-7313); the Military Exports judgments (Commission v. Finland 
(C-284/05) [2009] ECR I-11705; Commission v. Sweden (C-294/05) [2009] ECR I-11777; Commission v. Italy 
(C-387/05) [2009] ECR I-11831; Commission v. Greece (C-409/05) [2009] ECR I-11859; Commission v. 
Denmark (C-461/05) [2009] ECR I-11887; Commission v. Portugal (C-38/06) [2010] ECR I-1569; Commission 
v. Italy (C-239/06) [2009] ECR I-11913) and Finnish Turntables (Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi Oy (C-615/10) 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:324, and most recently in Ellinika Nafpigeia (C-246/12 P), ECLI:EU:C:2013:133, and 
Schiebel Aircraft (C-474/12) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2139. 
53 Johnston (Case 222/84) [1986] ECR 1651, [1986] 3 CMLR 240, para. 26. See also Salgoil (Case13/68) 
[1968] ECR 453, at 463, [1969] CMLR 181, 192 and Commission v. Italy (Case7/68) [1968] ECR 633, at 644.    
54 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 19-20 citing AG La Pergola in Sirdar (C-273/97), ECLI:EU:C:1999:246. 
55 Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons [1991] OJ L 256/51 
and Council Directive 93/15/EEC on the harmonization of the provisions relating to the placing on the market 
and supervision of explosives for civil uses [1993] OJ L 121/20. The ICT is without prejudice to these 
Directives. See Recital 15 ICT. 
56 Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of 
exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items [2009] L 134//1. This Regulation requires controls on 
the transfer of certain items listed in Annex IV: Articles 2(11) and 22. See COM(2011) 393 final, at 18-19. 
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place unharmonised. Member States no longer need to introduce or maintain other 
restrictions unless exceptionally required by Articles 36 or 346 TFEU.57  
 
2.2.2. Nature and scope of harmonisation 
The key purported objective of harmonisation is to simplify intra-Union transfers. 58 
However, it is questionable to what extent the ICT achieves substantive minimum 
harmonisation. Simplification may address the complexity of national licencing measures by 
standardising the types of permissible licence. However, this does not address other equally, 
if not more, restrictive trade barriers, a prime example being restrictive licencing conditions, 
the national diversity of which was criticised in Section 2.1. This issue is compounded by the 
fact that the ICT does not fully address the underlying causes of complexity and diversity. 
Short of the EU adopting EU-wide comprehensive policies to coordinate both the transfer and 
export of defence products, the ICT’s default position is largely to accommodate rather than 
systematically address these concerns through its provisions. An important limitation of the 
ICT’s scope is that harmonisation of transfer rules and procedures is said to be without 
prejudice to Member States’ policies regarding transfers; 59  international obligations or 
commitments;60 and policies on the export of defence-related products.61 Consequently, as 
will be discussed in Section 4, Member States retain considerable discretion to determine the 
terms, conditions and products applicable for each type of licence including third country 
export limitations; the latter remains a key organising construct of the ICT which conditions 
its application.62 Therefore, the simplification to be achieved through standardised licencing 
is undermined by the continuing diversity of national approaches on these key issues. A 
revised ICT should identify more clearly its harmonisation objectives and their scope. 
 The ICT is also equivocal with regard to its scope of coverage concerning 
“intergovernmental cooperation” broadly construed but undefined in the ICT. As will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.1, the ICT permits rather than requires publication of a general 
licence for the purposes of participation in an “intergovernmental cooperation programme”.63 
However, as will be discussed in Section 4.3.3, Member States may exempt from licencing 
transfers necessary for the implementation of a “cooperative armament programme between 
Member States”.64 Further, a Member State or the Commission at their own initiative may 
seek to amend the ICT to also exempt a transfer necessary for “intergovernmental 
cooperation” as referred to in Article 1(4).65 Article 1(4) provides that the ICT does not affect 
the possibility for Member States to pursue and further develop intergovernmental 
cooperation, whilst complying with the ICT.66  
 Therefore, on the one hand, the LoI identified in Section 2.1 could continue to provide 
an independent framework for more detailed licencing measures thereby potentially 
57 Recital 13 ICT.  
58 Recitals 6 and 43 and Article 1 ICT. See Recital 3 ICT referring to the more general objectives of removing 
disparities which may distort competition and hamper innovation, industrial cooperation and competitiveness.  
59 Recital 6 ICT.  
60 Recital 7 ICT. 
61  Ibid. and Article 1(2) ICT. See also Recital 30 ICT referring to Member State cooperation within the 
framework of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment [2008] OJ L 335/99. See also SWD(2016) 
398 final/2, at 24. 
62 The number of references to exports in the Recitals are alone indicative. See Recitals 4, 7, 12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
31, 33, 34, 35 and 36 ICT. See also GRIP, supra note 7, at 60. 
63 Article 5(3) ICT. “Intergovernmental cooperation programme” is not defined. 
64 Article 4(2)(c) ICT. Similarly, “Cooperative armament programme” is not defined. 
65 See Recital 16 ICT and Article 4(3)(c) ICT. 
66 See also Recital 8 ICT. “Intergovernmental cooperation” is not defined. 
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influencing the future development of the ICT regime.67 On the other hand, the co-existence 
of intergovernmental and supranational licencing regimes in a “two-speed” Europe may not 
be sustainable. The LoI acquis has already been largely transferred to the EU in light of the 
EU’s exercise of competences in the field of defence trade.68 Further, certain Member States 
may argue that licencing measures adopted under frameworks outside the ICT to which they 
are not party may be discriminatory, a risk identified as a particular reason for introducing the 
ICT.69 A revised ICT should clarify its coverage regarding intergovernmental cooperation. 
  
3. General coverage 
The ICT applies to defence-related products: Articles 2 and 3(1) ICT. These are set out in an 
Annex which must correspond to the EU Common Military List (“CML”)70 adopted in the 
context of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP for defence exports.71 Article 13(1) 
ICT requires the Commission to update the Annex to strictly correspond to the CML and 
which has, to date, already been amended three times. 72 This is intended to address the 
criticism of the variable use of national lists discussed in Section 2.1. However, the ICT’s 
harmonisation-through-simplification objective has thus already been compromised. Whilst 
the Annex should be identical to the CML at all times, for most of the year it has not fully 
corresponded because the procedure for amending and transposing the Annex has taken at 
least seven months.73 The Commission therefore rightly considers it necessary to simplify the 
procedure for aligning the Annex and CML,74 but is yet to “examine options to simplify and 
speed up annual updates”.75  
The 2016 Evaluation Report makes no concrete proposal for an amendment; rather it 
contemplates a “limited revision of the Directive, e.g. by separating the Annex from the 
Directive and by annual adoption of the updates by Commission decision”. 76 This is the only 
aspect of the ICT for which the Commission discusses a ‘hard law’ amendment in the short 
term as opposed to the revision of certain of the ICT’s other provisions in the “longer run”.77 
However, the Evaluation Report appears obscure and opaque on this issue.78 It could be 
assumed that the Commission is suggesting that the Annex should be separated from the 
Directive as a stand-alone document to be periodically amended by a Commission Decision. 
Yet, it is not entirely clear how this will reduce delay and improve coherence. 
Moreover, the two Commission Recommendations published with the 2016 
Evaluation Report are relevant here. As will be discussed in Section 4.3.2. below, contracting 
authorities have excluded certain products from falling within the scope of general transfer 
licences thereby limiting their harmonising potential. By contrast, the Recommendations 
contain “a minimum set of less sensitive defence related products and components” to be 
67 The authors are grateful to Mr. Ian Bendelow for discussions on the LoI’s continuing lead role.  
68 The relevant Sub-Committee recognises the EU’s competence to regulate intra-Union transfers. 
69 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, Table of Comparison of Options at 44. 
70 Common Military List of the European Union [2007] OJ L88/58. See also Recital 10 ICT.  
71 The CML is updated by the Council annually usually as a consequence of an amendment to the ‘Munitions 
List’ adopted in the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The latest version is the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, List of Dual-
Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List, WA-LIST (14) 2* 25 March 2015.  
72 Recitals 37 and 45 and Article 13(1) ICT. See Commission Directive 2010/80/EU [2010] OJ L308/11; 
Directive 2012/10/EU [2012] OJ L85/3; Directive 2014/108/EU [2014] OJ L359/117. 
73 Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 13.  
74 Ibid. See also 2016 Evaluation Report, supra note 5, at 9; GRIP, supra note 7, at 64 and Technopolis, supra 
note 4 at Appendix G, at 107. 
75 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12 
76 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12. 
77 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12 on revision in the “longer run” regarding exemptions, for example. 
78 No further detail is provided by SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 38-40.  
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covered by general transfer licences79 issued for certified recipients 80 (see Sections 4.3.1. 
and 6. below) and for armed forces and certain contracting authorities81 (see Section 4.3.1 
below). This “minimum set” is a “subset” of the list of products laid down in the ICT’s 
Annex. The Recommendations also exclude certain Military List (ML) categories completely 
from falling within the minimum set,82 include others for most goods but with exceptions, or 
only include a few goods of some other ML categories. Therefore, Member States and the 
Commission have carefully decided, item-by-item on the CML, if the item can be included in 
the subset.83  
However, it is doubtful whether this reduces the coverage problems outlined above. 
This is because the “subset” of defence goods, while comprising more than half of the list in 
the Annex, is not necessarily immune from the problems regarding updating and aligning the 
Annex and CML outlined above. At best, the Recommendations partly address the issue of 
which types of product should typically be subject to a general transfer licence for the armed 
forces and certified recipient categories, as a minimum (see below Section 4.3.2). The 
categories within the sub-set would still have to be updated, presumably by the proposed 
Commission Decisions. Thus, the Commission assumes that by identifying a subset of 
defence goods for general licences in just two select circumstances, this soft-law approach 
will expedite the uptake and use of general licences and remove barriers to trade more 
quickly than ‘hard law’ harmonisation. The latter would involve an amendment to the ICT, 
which is considered but not (yet) proposed in the 2016 Evaluation Report.  
It is argued that the Commission’s approach is highly problematic. Fundamentally, it 
raises underlying constitutional questions about the propriety of using CFSP-like mechanisms 
in the context of internal transfers, empowering Member States but excluding the European 
Parliament84 and ultimately the CJEU85 in an area with Internal Market competence (see 
Section 2.2 above). Further, it relies on the good faith of Member States or peer pressure to 
adhere to the Recommendation. The crucial issues of coverage by reference to the Annex and 
CML should be addressed in a clear and certain manner, principally through a ‘hard law’ 
amendment of the ICT itself and not exclusively through confusing ‘soft-law’ 
Recommendations. As will be argued in Section 4.3.1. below, a ‘hard law’ amendment 
should similarly clarify the circumstances in which general licences must be used, according 
to which minimum prescribed categories of product.  
 
4. Transfers and licences 
The fundamental innovation intended by the ICT is to qualitatively differentiate transfers 
from exports. Article 3(2) defines a ‘transfer’ as “any transmission or movement of a 
defence-related product from a supplier to a recipient in another Member State”. 86  The 
transfer of defence products from one Member State to another must be subject to prior 
authorisation in the form of a licence. However, a further licence cannot be imposed for mere 
passage87 of those products through one or more other Member States or for entrance onto 
79 COM(2016) 760 final, at 11. 
80 C(2016) 7728 final, at 3. 
81 C(2016) 7711 final, at 3. 
82 For example, ML2 large smooth-bore weapons, ML3 ammunition, or ML8 energetic material.    
83 See Recitals 5 of both Commission Recommendations C(2016) 7728 final and C(2016) 7711 final. 
84 An amendment of the ICT would involve the European Parliament through the ordinary legislative procedure.  
85 A Recommendation is not legally binding and can therefore not be challenged in an action for annulment. 
86 Article 3(3) and 3(4) ICT which define ‘supplier’ and ‘recipient’, respectively. 
87 Recitals 9, 17 and Article 4(1) ICT. Article 3(7) ICT defines ‘passage through’ as “the transport of defence-
related products through one or more Member States other than the originating and receiving Member States.”  
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Member State territory, unless justified on public security or public policy grounds. 88 Further 
to this aim, the ICT seeks to facilitate the progressive replacement of individual ex-ante 
control, exercised through narrowly defined licences, with more broadly defined licences 
compensated by ex-post controls, including conditions on export after licenced transfers.89 It 
is therefore important to acknowledge that the ICT does not create a European “licence-free 
zone” of free movement comparable to most other goods. A transfer licence is still a form of 
prior-authorisation but one which is to be distinguished from an export licence. 90  Two 
principal reasons have been identified for retaining a licencing regime. The first concerns the 
relative infancy of a common foreign policy and “uneven levels of trust” about the extent to 
which certain external borders maintain sufficient control.91 The second is that the removal of 
licencing altogether would complicate enforcement of export controls that are otherwise 
required by existing international export control regimes.92 Ultimately, licencing was still 
considered necessary as a “vehicle” to carry possible re-export limitations.93  
 
4.1. Types of transfer licence 
Prior to the ICT, individual, general, and global licences were available. All three have been 
retained under the ICT and transposed into national laws.94 Member States remain free to 
determine the appropriate choice of licence and the types of products covered by it.95 An 
individual transfer licence must be specifically requested by a supplier. It grants one specific 
authorisation for a single transfer of a specified quantity of specified products to be 
transmitted in one or several shipments to only one recipient (Article 7 ICT). A general 
transfer licence is an authorisation granted to suppliers established in one Member State to 
perform transfers of specified defence-related products to categories of recipients located in 
another Member State. The main distinguishing feature is that a Member State must publish a 
general licence in order that a supplier meeting its terms and conditions is directly authorised 
to transfer without having to specifically request to do so in each case (Article 5 (1) and 
Recital 21 ICT). Removal of such requests enables a freer movement of specified goods and 
increased security of supply.  Between the extremes of an individual and general licence is 
the global transfer licence. A global licence must be specifically requested by a supplier. It 
grants a specific authorisation to transfer products to authorised recipients in one or more 
other Member States (Article 6(1) ICT). The significant point of departure for the ICT is an 
attempt to change the type of licence predominantly used in practice, away from restrictive 
individual licences towards broader general licences and to exempt certain transfers from 
licencing altogether.  
 
4.2. Individual transfer licences 
88 Recital 14 ICT identifies the safety of storage, risk of diversion and prevention of crime as legitimate reasons. 
Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands have made use of these exceptions to maintain entrance and passage 
licences or prior notification systems for certain product categories. See Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 
18. According to The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 7, at 43 
fn72, this is a limitation to the ICT’s application; in practice, companies will have to inquire as to the existence 
of such measures. Technopolis, supra note 4, Appendix K, at 171 states that such measures are permissible on 
public security or transport safety grounds but acknowledges that their compatibility with EU law has not been 
comprehensively tested and even considers a potential need for legislation to address transit licences.  
89 Recital 29 ICT. 
90 Article 3(5) ICT which defines a ‘transfer licence’. See also Recital 16 ICT. Article 3(6) ICT defines an 
‘export licence’. 
91 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 24. 
92 Ibid. identifying Wassenaar and the Missile Technology Control Regime. See also Recitals 7 and 28 ICT. 
93 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 24-25.  
94 Ibid., at 4. See also Article 4(4) ICT and Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 8.  
95 Article 4(5) and Recital 18 ICT. 
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Formerly, individual transfer licences were the most common licence, contributing 
significantly to the costs and barriers to trade discussed in Section 2.1.96 Notwithstanding 
their continued availability, the ICT intends to reduce recourse to individual licences to four 
exhaustively defined circumstances discussed below. However, beyond prescribing these 
circumstances, the ICT contains no further provisions regarding the permitted terms and 
conditions and period of validity.97  
 The first circumstance in which individual licences may continue to be used is where 
the request is limited to one transfer. This is unlikely to be particularly problematic given that 
the licence is not imposed by the licencing authority in order to limit the user’s ability to 
transfer but rather a single transfer is expressly requested by the user. The second is where an 
individual licence is necessary for compliance with international obligations and 
commitments. This reflects the ICT’s general approach to ensuring compliance with other 
international obligations and commitments.98 Reliance on this circumstance is nevertheless 
likely to be subject to implied limitations to ensure that those international agreements or 
arrangements genuinely require an individual licence and are not used to circumvent the 
Directive. The third is where an individual licence is necessary for the protection of essential 
security interests or on grounds of public policy.99 As indicated in Section 2.2.1, this may be 
an attempt to accommodate such interests inside the regime rather than through a TFEU 
exception or derogation. However, to avoid this circumstance developing into a loophole, in 
line with the jurisprudence on these TFEU derogations outlined in Section 2.2.1 above, the 
use of an individual licence should be subject to proportionality requirements and judicial 
review. There is a danger that, when challenged, Member States could retrospectively justify 
an individual licence under this circumstance. Therefore, there is a clear need for the reasons 
to grant an individual licence to be documented and reviewed by a senior licencing officer. 
The ICT should be amended to include such a requirement.      
 The final circumstance is where a Member State has “serious reason” to believe that 
the supplier will not be able to comply with all the terms and conditions necessary to grant it 
a global transfer licence (see Section 4.4 below). Whilst this reinforces the ICT’s attempt to 
institute a hierarchy or preference of licences (i.e. general or global in preference to 
individual), Member States exercise discretion to determine the terms and conditions (and 
products) for each type of licence. It is therefore difficult to know which terms and conditions 
are more or less susceptible to non-compliance such as to legitimate use of an individual 
licence. This is symptomatic more generally of the fact that the ICT does not provide clear 
guidance to Member States in differentiating when a particular type of licence should be used 
as well as the terms and conditions applicable to each type. Secondly, it is not clear what will 
constitute a “serious reason”. It is argued that a revised ICT should retain a circumstance in 
which an authority grants an individual licence on its own initiative (as opposed to at the 
supplier’s request) and for reasons other than to protect essential security, as some default 
authorisation is necessary e.g. if it is not possible to comply with an alternative licence and 
for truly sensitive products.100 However, clarity is required as to the reasons that might justify 
an individual licence as well as the burden of proof. This is necessary to safeguard against the 
risk of abuse which could prejudice a successful transition to general licences as the norm.   
96 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 36. 
97 According to UNISYS, supra note 6, at 14, prior to the ICT, individual licences typically expired after 12 
months or on fulfilment of a specified quantity. In the UK, individual licences under the ICT are considered 
equivalent to Standard Individual Export Licence (SIELs) and are valid for two years. See the Department for 
Business Innovation & Skills, Notice to Exporters 2012/37 Implementation of the European Union Directive 
2009/43/EC (Intra-Community Transfer of Defence Goods or ‘ICT Directive’), at 3. 
98 Recital 7 ICT. 
99 See also Recital 14 ICT. 
100 The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for discussions on this issue.  
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 Ultimately, there are few indications that recourse to individual licences is decreasing.  
According to the 2016 Evaluation Report individual licences continue to be used for 80-90 
per cent of transfers.101 Starkly, the Report contains scarce reference to individual licences. 
Unlike the Recommendations and proposals for soft-law guidance regarding general licences, 
the Evaluation Report simply states that competent authorities should “encourage operators 
to use [general licences] instead of [individual licences] where circumstances allow.”102 
 
4.3. General transfer licences 
As indicated, Member States are free to determine the appropriate licence: Article 4(5) ICT. 
However, the ICT signals a clear emphasis on general transfer licences as the least restrictive 
form.103 Prior to the ICT, Member States, with the exception of the UK, did not provide for 
extensive use of general licences. 104  The Commission had even considered a regime 
exclusively comprising general licences. Whilst this could have minimised bureaucracy and 
significantly improved security of supply, the Commission considered it to be unacceptable 
not least because the general licence is not suitable for the most sensitive equipment.105 
 
4.3.1. Circumstances requiring general licences 
The ICT provides a list of “at least” four circumstances in which publication of a general 
licence is mandatory: Article 5(2)(a)-(d) ICT. Therefore, Member States may exceed the 
minimum by requiring general licences in additional circumstances not listed.106   
 Perhaps the most significant circumstance requiring a general licence is where the 
recipient is certified in accordance with the ICT’s certification provisions. The combined 
ability of a supplier to rely on a general licence compensated by certification of the recipient 
is a key component of the ICT, which is reserved for discussion in Section 6 below.107 As 
outlined in Section 3, above, one of the two November 2016 Commission Recommendations 
provides that Member States will issue general licences for certified recipients covering, “as a 
minimum”, the sub-set of products listed in the ICT Annex.108 This is intended to result in 
quicker issuance of general licences with regard to those products. Additionally, the 
Recommendation provides for a non-exhaustive list of conditions to be incorporated into the 
general licence for certified recipients, concerning geographic validity, re-transfers within the 
EEA, subsequent sales not known at the time of transfer, and ex-post verification.109    
 A second circumstance is where the recipient is part of a Member State’s armed 
forces or a defence contracting authority, purchasing for the exclusive use by that Member 
State’s armed forces. This circumstance is intended to have a specific impact on defence 
procurement. For instance, Article 23(a) Defence and Security Procurement Directive 
2009/81/EC provides that, in order to ensure security of supply, a contracting authority can 
require a tenderer to demonstrate that it will be able to honour its obligations regarding the 
101 Supra note 5, at 5. See also Technopolis, supra note 4, at 2. This constitutes approximately 20,000-25,000 
per year, see Appendix G, 112-113, Table 48. 
102 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12. SWD(2016) 398 final/2 does not address individual licences. 
103 GRIP, supra note 7, at 42: “the licence of reference.” 
104 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 15, 34. The UK has widely implemented a general licence for military 
goods under Open General Export Licences (OGELs). See Masson et al., The “Transfer Directive”, supra note 
3, at 15-19. This has enabled an effective transposition of the ICT in the UK with relatively few adjustments. 
See also Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 97 referring at 2 to the ICT model being “UK inspired”. 
105 Impact Assessment, ibid., at 34-35. 
106 On minimum harmonisation: Weatherill, “Beyond preemption? Shared competence and constitutional change 
in the European Community” in O’Keefe and Twomey (eds) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chancery 
Law Publishing, 1994); Dougan, ‘Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 853.  
107 Article 9 ICT concerns the certification of recipients of defence related products. See also Recital 23 ICT.   
108 C(2016) 7728 final, at 3 with the sub-set list at 3-4.  
109 C(2016) 7728 final, at 5-6. 
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export, transfer and transit of goods associated with the contract. It is usually the case that at 
the time of tender preparation, the authorisation to transfer equipment will not yet have been 
granted. Therefore, in some cases, contracting authorities may consider that a foreign supplier 
poses a greater risk with regard to guaranteeing securing supply than a domestic supplier 
given the difficulty of having to obtain a licence. The Commission’s Guidance Note on 
Security of Supply, published to assist transposition of Directive 2009/81/EC, suggests that 
this uncertainty is now removed given that a general licence will have already been published 
with the necessary authorisation. 110  Recital 22 ICT also indicates that this will “greatly 
increase” security of supply to armed forces.  
 However, as will be discussed in Section 5 below, general licences can still be 
withdrawn or granted with end-use restrictions and much still depends on the type of products 
covered, all of which may continue to hinder security of supply.111 More fundamentally, it 
may be questioned to what extent security of supply can be guaranteed whatever licence is 
used not least because such guarantees only represent the tenderer’s position at the time of 
tender. 112  Rather, the best assurance of optimal security of supply is to eliminate any 
licencing requirement altogether. This is currently only possible if a Member State decides to 
exempt armed forces transfers from prior authorisation. As will be indicated in Section 4.3.3 
below, there is an argument for presumptively exempting armed forces transfers from prior 
authorisation. According to the latest report, the armed forces circumstance currently 
represents 21 per cent of applications for registration to use an ICT general licence.113  
Similar to the 2016 Commission Recommendation concerning general licences for 
certified recipients, another Recommendation provides that Member States will issue general 
licences for armed forces and relevant contracting authorities covering, “as a minimum”, the 
sub-set of products listed in the ICT Annex as well as a non-exhaustive list of conditions to 
be incorporated concerning geographic validity, re-transfers within the EEA, subsequent sales 
not known at the time of transfer, and ex-post verification. 114  The approach in the 
Recommendation must be contrasted with the fact that, as discussed in Section 4.3.3. below, 
the ICT also currently provides that Member States may actually exempt transfers from all 
licence requirements where the recipient is part of the armed forces. It is clear that these 
options suggest that transfers under this constellation present lesser security risks in general. 
This combination of coverage and optional exemption raises questions as to whether transfers 
for armed forces should be subject to licencing at all. Ultimately, both the fact that only a few 
Member States have provided for full exemption and the Commission’s Recommendation 
suggest a continued desire to have a general licence for armed forces albeit with a 
commitment to greater convergence in products covered and the possibility of exemption 
from licencing. However, it is argued that the Recommendation is insufficient to achieve 
minimum harmonisation for armed forces transfers. As indicated, the possibility of 
exemption already signals that this field is more a candidate for total liberalisation than 
optional harmonisation through a Recommendation. Therefore, if general licences do remain 
strictly necessary for such transfers, at the very least, the ICT should be revised to make it a 
legal requirement that general licences for armed forces transfers must be subject to 
minimum prescribed product categories covered, prescribed categories excluded and 
110  DG Internal Market and Services, Guidance Note, Security of Supply, at 10. There is no comparable 
Guidance Note for the implementation of the ICT although the issuance of such guidance is rare.  
111 This view has also been expressed by the UK in its guidance published to assist interpretation of the UK 
Regulations implementing Directive 2009/81/EC. See The Defence and Security Public Contract Regulations 
2011, Chapter 12 – Security of Supply, at 7, para. 38.  
112 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat?’ supra note 2, at 24. 
113 Technopolis, supra note 4, Appendix G, at 114. See also: SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 18. 
114 C(2016) 7711, at 5-6. 
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minimum conditions. Indeed, the 2016 Evaluation Report itself considers the “possibility of 
converting the [Recommendations] on [general transfer licences] into binding provisions.115 
Whilst the Commission’s tentative approach is understandable given the continuing diversity 
of Member State practices post-ICT, it is difficult to see how a non-legally binding 
Recommendation will significantly improve compliance. It also seems impractical for the 
Commission to issue non-legally binding Recommendations every time it wishes to test 
whether or not an area could be amenable to further harmonisation through legal reform at 
some indeterminate point in the future. It is also not conducive to legal certainty. 
  The third and fourth circumstances are where the transfer is made for the purposes of 
demonstration, evaluation or exhibition or for the purposes of maintenance and repair.116 The 
latest report indicates that these represent 71 per cent of applications to use general licences 
and are therefore the most common.117 Again, as will be indicated in Section 4.3.3, it is 
arguable that such transfers could be presumptively exempted from licencing altogether. 
However, the high uptake of general licences for this circumstance suggest that retention of a 
general licence is the preferred approach. It might also explain why no Commission 
Recommendation was issued for this circumstance. However, the 2016 Evaluation Report 
suggests that a further Recommendation for this circumstance is considered.118      
 In addition, Member States participating in an intergovernmental cooperation 
programme may publish a general licence for transfers necessary for the programme’s 
execution.119 Few large armaments producing Member States have transposed this option.120 
As explained in Section 4.3.3 below, it is arguable that such transfers could be the subject of 
presumptive exemption from licencing altogether, although this matter is complicated by 
general uncertainty about the extent to which the ICT should include or exclude 
intergovernmental cooperation within its coverage as discussed in Section 2.2.2. above. 
 Overall, the potential variability of national transposition resulting from minimum 
harmonisation is already apparent. According to the latest report, at least three Member States 
do not offer any general licences, four do not offer all four mandatory licences whilst at least 
ten others go beyond the mandatory circumstances e.g. by providing for the optional 
cooperative armament programme general licences or for transfers to the police, customs and 
border and coast guards.121 The ICT also seems to suggest that further general licences could 
be published where the risks to security are low in view of the nature of the product and 
recipients.122 The 2016 Evaluation Report considers creating new circumstances, “e.g. for 
product return after exhibition or repair, for cross-border cooperation in research, [or] for all 
purpose transfers (e.g. covering purchase, maintenance, supply of spare parts).”123 However, 
115 COM(2016) 760 final, at 13. 
116 In the case of maintenance and repair, the recipient must be the originating supplier of the defence-related 
products: Article 5(2)(d) ICT. 
117 Technopolis, supra note 4, Appendix G, 114: ‘demonstration, evaluation or exhibition (41%) and ‘repair or 
maintenance’ (31%). See also: SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 18. 
118 COM(2016) 760 final, at 11 (bullet point 3). 
119 Recital 24 and Article 5(3) ICT. An example might include the Eurofigher/Typhoon fighter. See generally: 
Heuninckx, The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement in the European Union (CUP, 2016), Chapter 8. 
120 Article 5(3) ICT. According to the Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 9, Spain envisages general licences 
for transfers related to operations of NATO and NAMSA; Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, and Malta envisage general 
licences for cooperation programmes. See also The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European 
Defence, supra note 7, at 46, fn 82. This means that large armaments-producing Member States have not 
transposed this option. The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation.  
121 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 33, Table 14. Bulgaria, Iceland and Ireland do not currently offer any general 
licences; France, Italy, Romania and Slovenia do not provide all of the mandatory licences. See also Appendix 
G, 111. See also: SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 16-17. 
122 Recital 25 ICT. 
123 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12-13. 
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this is not a proposed amendment and only considered “in the long run”.124 Conversely, as 
will be suggested in Section 4.3.3 below, the ICT’s primary focus should be on subjecting the 
highest risk transfers to licencing whilst exempting low risk transfers from licencing 
altogether, rather than establishing minimum licencing requirements whatever the risk. 
 
4.3.2. Coverage of general licences 
It is recalled from Section 3 above that Member States determine not only the choice of 
licence but also the types of products listed in the Annex corresponding to the CML covered 
by the licence.125 Several issues have arisen in this regard. Firstly, practice already indicates 
that, whilst all Member States refer to the CML, there is continuing use of national and 
international lists when determining the coverage of licences. 126  This variability is 
exacerbated by the fact that the Annex does not always correspond to the CML.127  
 Secondly, it is questionable whether the ICT provides an effective balance between 
Member States’ freedom to limit the types of products that can be subject to a general licence 
and ensuring that general licences can be used for as broad a range of products as possible. 
On the one hand, Member States appear to define the scope of their general licences case-by-
case based on factors such as the recipient in question, the sensitivity of the product, risk 
assessment and diversion risk on export.128 This is a perfectly legitimate exercise, allowing 
authorities to tailor a licence to a particular security scenario.129 On the other hand, post-
transposition practice suggests that there is a lack of consensus as to how to define or classify 
“sensitive”130 products that should be excluded from the scope of a general licence.131 Given 
the need to encourage the uptake of general licences, it is understandable that the ICT 
provides maximum flexibility to select from the full range of listed products. Further, it is 
preferable for authorities to assess the sensitivity of products to be covered by a general 
licence as opposed to using the sensitivity of products as a basis to simply legitimate recourse 
to individual licences as has previously been the case. However, as discussed in Section 3, the 
2016 Recommendations clearly indicate the possibility to distinguish less sensitive products 
that should typically be subject to general licences from those which should or may not. 132 It 
was argued that an amendment to the ICT should formalise mandatory product categories 
typically covered by general licences and those prima facie excluded.133 The ICT should also 
include an amendment that requires that any licence conditions must reflect a genuine and 
proportionate control need to avoid possible attempts to circumvent the ICT. Whilst Member 
States might argue that this impinges on the exercise of their transfer policies, it has been 
observed that national practice at present “varies greatly […] and patterns are difficult to 
establish”.134 Lack of “visibility and clarity” of different national lists135 and conditions has 
ultimately made general licences less attractive for companies.136  
124 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12. 
125 Recital 18 and Article 4(5) ICT. Concerning general licences specifically, see Article 5(1) ICT. 
126 GRIP supra note 7, at 23-27, 28-9, and 38-9. 
127 Ibid., at 25, Luxembourg appears to be the only country referring to the most recent version of the ICT 
Annex in the definition of defence goods covered by its general transfer licences. 
128 GRIP, supra note 7, at 23.  
129 The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. 
130 This must be contrasted with Article 4(8) ICT which indicates that the sensitivity of a transfer of components 
is relevant to determining the application of any export limitations for components. See Article 4(8) ICT. 
131 GRIP, supra note 7, at 38. 
132 Article 4(7) ICT already requires Member States to assess the sensitivity of the transfer when determining the 
terms and conditions of licences for components, taking into account their nature and significance. 
133  An obvious example might be category ML17g nuclear power generating equipment. The authors are 
grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for his observations. 
134 GRIP, supra note 7, at 27. 
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 It has been suggested that the ICT should ideally include a harmonised list of covered 
products using the CML as an already widely used reference point with clearer 
correspondence to international control lists.137 A harmonised list would be comprehensive 
based on a common understanding of “sensitive products” to be definitively included or 
excluded from the list. However, it appears impossible at this stage to recommend a detailed 
list of sensitive products to be excluded that would be accepted by all Member States.138 It 
has therefore been recommended that a positive or minimum list should be adopted. 139 
Determining “sensitivity” of products based on product coverage rather than Member State 
discretion may reduce subjectivity. Several Member States and companies have called for 
such a list “while taking into account national limitations” which would presumably need to 
be clearly defined.140 However, some flexibility needs to be retained to encourage the use of 
general licences. The 2016 Commission Recommendations on general licences for armed 
forces and certified companies,141 discussed in Sections 4.3.1 above and 6. below, address 
these issues to some extent, but only in relation to the subset of defence goods they contain.      
 
4.3.3. Exemptions  
It is recalled from Section 4.3.1 above that the ICT identifies four circumstances in which 
general licences are required. However, the ICT also identifies five circumstances in which 
Member States may optionally exempt transfers from prior authorisation altogether. 142 As 
will be discussed, it is suggested that the similarity between certain circumstances requiring 
or permitting general licences and certain circumstances permitting exemption from licencing 
altogether, indicate uncertainty as to the level at which to set the floor of harmonisation. On 
the one hand, it could be argued that the exemptions merely offer Member States the option 
of going beyond harmonisation to achieve total licence-free liberalisation. On the other hand, 
it also raises legitimate questions as to whether certain circumstances requiring or permitting 
the use of general licences should be subject to prior authorisation through a licence at all. 
 Two of the circumstances allowing optional exemption from prior authorisation 
appear to be the least controversial in achieving total liberalisation. These are, first, where the 
EU, NATO, the International Atomic Energy Agency or other intergovernmental 
organisations send supplies in the performance of their tasks (Article 4(2)(b) ICT) and, 
second, “the transfer is linked to humanitarian aid in the case of disaster or as a donation in 
an emergency” (Article 4(2)(d) ICT). As indicated in Section 4.3.1 above, there are no similar 
circumstances otherwise requiring mandatory use of a general licence. Concerning the first 
circumstance, whilst supplier or recipient status as an international body does not 
automatically eliminate security and export diversion risks, such risks are likely to be limited 
in transfers between allies as opposed to a recipient who is a private economic operator. Yet, 
according to the latest study, only eight Member States provide full exemption; five provide 
partial exemption with some countries specifying only a few organisations or NATO only.143 
Concerning the second circumstance, in addition to enabling expeditious transfer, references 
135 GRIP, ibid., at 27. According to the Transposition Report, supra note 5, at 9 only six Member States had 
communicated their respective lists to the Commission. 
136 GRIP, supra note 7, at 39.  
137 GRIP, ibid., at 63 emphasises the design of the list based specifically on the Wassenaar List. 
138 GRIP, supra note 7, at 39. 
139 GRIP, ibid., at 63.  
140 GRIP, supra note 7, at 48 and 63. 
141 C(2016) 7711 final; C(2016) 7728 final. 
142 Article 4(3) ICT further provides for the Commission on its own initiative or at a Member State’s request to 
amend the ICT to exempt three additional circumstances from prior authorisation.  
143 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 31-32, Table 13. Eleven countries provided no exemption. For a breakdown of 
exemptions applied in national legislation, see Appendix H and SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 15-16. 
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to disasters and donations suggest that the material in question will not raise major security 
concerns. This exemption is also consistent with the EU’s humanitarian obligations. 144 
However, again, only ten Member States provide full exemption; two provide partial 
exemption with one country only exempting government donations and the other limiting 
equipment to rescue equipment.145 
 More problematic are two circumstances permitting optional exemption from prior 
authorisation which, broadly construed, cover the same circumstances which Member States 
must otherwise subject to mandatory general licencing. The first is where the supplier or 
recipient is a governmental body or part of the armed forces (Article 4(2)(a) ICT). This is 
similar to the mandatory ground for use of a general licence discussed in Section 4.3.1 
above. 146 The second is where the transfer is necessary for or after repair, maintenance, 
exhibition or demonstration (Article 4(2)(e) ICT). Again, this is similar to the mandatory 
ground for use of a general licence discussed in Section 4.3.1.147 Concerning the government 
body and armed forces exemption, a similar rationale applies to that of exemption of transfers 
by international organisations. It is reported that only eight Member States provide full 
exemption; nine provide partial exemption with many countries limiting its scope to cover 
use by that other Member State when its forces are being deployed abroad.148 Concerning the 
demonstration to repair exemption, this reflects the general reality that products at the 
pre/post-production stage carry a lower risk. It is reported that only five Member States 
provide full exemption and only five provide partial exemption, covering movement in only 
one direction or certain activities.149   
It is also recalled from Section 2.2.2 above, that Member States may exempt from 
licencing transfers necessary for the implementation of a “cooperative armament programme 
between Member States” (Article 4(2)(c) ICT). It is reported that only seven Member States 
have provided full exemption.150 This “half-way” position between exemption and permitted 
use of general licencing for defence cooperation reflects both the importance and flexibility 
attributed to cooperative programmes under the Defence Package as a whole. Directive 
2009/81/EC similarly provides for exclusion of cooperative programmes from its award 
procedures. 151  A transfer licence exemption is broadly consistent with such objectives, 
although, as indicated in Sections 2.2.2 and 4.3.1 above, the extent to which 
intergovernmental cooperation should be subject to, or excluded from, the ICT requires 
clarification.  
 The correspondence between certain circumstances permitting optional exemption 
and those requiring mandatory or permitted general licencing begs the question as to whether 
a revised ICT could be recalibrated. Firstly, the two circumstances providing optional 
exemption from prior authorisation which are not also covered by general licences i.e. 
international organisation and humanitarian transfers could be categorically excluded. 152 
144 Articles 208-211 TFEU. 
145 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 31-32, Table 13. 12 countries provided no exemption. For a breakdown of 
exemptions applied in national legislation, see Appendix H and SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 15-16. 
146 Article 5(2)(a) ICT. 
147 Article 5(2)(c) and (d) ICT. 
148 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 31-32, Table 13. Seven countries have no exemption. See breakdown of 
exemptions applied in national legislation, Appendix H. See also: SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 15-16. 
149 Technopolis, ibid., at 31-32, Table 13 and 33. Fourteen countries provided no exemption. For a breakdown of 
the exemptions as applied in national legislation, see Appendix H. 
150  Technopolis, supra note 4, at 32-32, Table 13. There are no partial exemptions. For a breakdown of 
exemptions applied in national legislation, see Appendix H and SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 15-16. 
151 See Article 13(c) Directive 2009/81/EC. For a discussion of this provision, see Trybus, Buying Defence and 
Security in Europe, supra note 2, at 283-288. 
152 This would not necessarily preclude the possibility for Member States to justify a licencing requirement 
based on Article 36 or 346 TFEU.  
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Secondly, the armed forces and demonstration to repair circumstances which are subject to 
general licences but which also correspond to circumstances permitting optional exemption 
could be presumptively excluded from prior authorisation altogether. This would possibly 
mean total licence free liberalisation perhaps subject only to possible prior authorisation if a 
public policy or public security reason can be established.153 This would send a clearer signal 
that such “low-risk” transfers should operate in a uniform licence free zone unless it can be 
established that prior authorisation is necessary in exceptional cases. As indicated in Section 
2.2 above, given that any form of licencing requirement is generally considered to be a 
restriction on the Internal Market, the fewer circumstances subject to licencing the better.154  
At present, the current portfolio of optional exemptions indicates flexibility but also a certain 
ambivalence as to the baseline at which to set harmonisation.155 This has caused further 
uncertainty in implementation by Member States. According to the latest study, there was 
“widespread confusion” among competent authorities in differentiating the circumstances 
permitting exemptions and the mandatory grounds for general licences.156  
 The 2016 Evaluation Report considers a possible revision of the ICT with regards to 
the exemptions, “such as: making exemptions binding on Member States and enlarging the 
scope of exemptions”.157 However, this is only considered in the “long run”, not proposed in 
the Report itself, and no details are given concerning which exemptions could be revised. 
 
4.4. Global transfer licences 
As indicated in Section 4.1 above, the global licence is situated between the extremes of a 
general licence and individual licence. Its main simplification potential is that it is not 
specific to a precise shipment and, thus, can be used several times to cover similar transfers 
and global transfer licences are typically not subject to quantitative limits and are valid over a 
long period. 158  Historically, global licences have been considered useful for routine 
shipments to habitual customers or for SMEs with limited catalogues.159 Their potential had 
already been realised in certain Member States before the ICT.160  
 However, it is observed that the intended effect of global licences is uncertain and 
difficult to discern in light of no or limited information having been communicated regarding 
their implementation and application under the ICT.161 Firstly, the underlying rationale for 
global licences is now unclear. The Commission opted against a ‘global licences only’ 
approach because a combination of general and global licences would enable general licences 
for routine non-sensitive transfers while also accommodating the necessary flexibility for 
153 Concerning cooperative programmes, there may be a case for the use of a licence if the programme concerns 
sensitive research and development (R&D).  
154 Perhaps even more radically, it may be questioned whether it would be possible to introduce requirements 
short of licencing to ensure that such transfers are subject to at least some form of monitoring provided such 
monitoring does not, itself, infringe EU law.  
155 Article 5(2) ICT enumerating the circumstances requiring mandatory general licences simply indicates that it 
is “without prejudice to Article 4(2)” enumerating the list of optional exemptions from prior authorisation. 
156 Technopolis, supra note 4, at Appendix G, at 108 stating that this was “presumably not helped by the similar 
categories given for each in the Directive”.  
157 COM(2016) 760 final, at 12. 
158 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 35 and 36. 
159 Impact Assessment, ibid., at 35. See also GRIP, supra note 7, at 39. 
160 GRIP, ibid. In 2002, France introduced global licences based on a catalogue of participating companies, 
specifically targeting SMEs. See Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 36. The first 35 licences replaced 1,250 
individual licences, a reduction in administrative bureaucracy by a ratio of 36. Similarly, during the ICT's 
preparatory phase, Romania indicated that it had replaced 700 individual licences with 7 global licences: ibid. 
161 Transposition Report supra note 7, at 10. In the UK, these are the equivalent of Open Individual Export 
Licence (OIELs). See generally, See Notice to Exporters 2012/37 supra note 97, at 3. 
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more sensitive transfers through global licences.162 Therefore, whilst global licences were 
formerly used to cover routine shipments of less sensitive products in great quantity over a 
long period, it now appears that global licences should be used to cover less routine 
shipments of more sensitive products over a maximum period of three years.163 Secondly, in 
contrast to general and individual licences, the ICT does not prescribe circumstances for use 
of global licences.164 Thirdly, Member States must determine the products or categories of 
products covered and the authorised recipients, again, indicating considerable discretion in 
the use of such licences (Article 6(2) ICT). It is argued that this does not make the global 
licence the intended “default” type of licence under the ICT. It is suggested that if this had 
been the EU legislator’s intention, more detailed provision on global licences would have 
been included. The inclusion of global licences may reflect the view that they are intended 
merely as a transitional measure until general licences are fully operational.165 
 The Commission had acknowledged a small risk that Member States may define 
global licences in such restrictive terms as to be equivalent to individual licences, but states 
that there is little reason to fear such abuses as a Member State would compromise the 
competitive position of its industries. 166 However, this does presuppose that competition 
rather than national security or some other motive will be the primary determinant when 
making licencing decisions. Nevertheless, global licences could be relied on, in particular, by 
small businesses used to such licences in order to avoid the perceived administrative and 
resource burdens of the certification regime under general licences discussed in Section 6 
below.167 The latest report indicates that between 2012-2014, there has been a slight increase 
in the use of global licences,168 but the 2016 Evaluation Report suggests that global licences 
constitute less than 5 per cent of transfers.169   
 If global licences are transitional, it is suggested that the ICT should provide an 
illustrative list of circumstances in which a global licence must or can be used. This is 
necessary to clarify the role of global licences as an alternative to general and individual 
licences. Either way, the current provisions on global licences look somewhat brief and basic 
when compared to the more detailed general and individual licencing provisions. 
 
4.5. The details: licence form, registration, terms, conditions and supplier information 
The ICT neither prescribes any particular documentary form for general licences nor their 
publication in specific locations. According to recent reports on implementation of the ICT, 
general licences are often difficult to access, available in different documentary formats 
varying in length, published in languages other than English, and not generally available 
through national websites.170 Public visibility is integral to the ICT’s credibility among its 
users. A revised ICT could introduce further harmonisation to address some of these issues 
162 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 36. 
163 Article 6(2). Admittedly, Article 6(2) ICT provides that this period may be renewed although does not 
identify a minimum or maximum length of renewal. The UK’s latest guidance suggests that the limitation of 
global licences to only three years constitutes a “significant difference” to previous UK practice. See Notice to 
Exporters 2012/37 supra note 97, at 3. 
164 Rather, Recital 26 ICT simply states that “[w]here a general transfer licence cannot be published, Member 
states should, upon request, grant a global transfer licence […] except in the case set out in this Directive […]”. 
165 GRIP, supra note 7, at 39. 
166 Ibid. 
167 The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 7, at 49 and fn95. 
168 An increase of approximately 18 per cent. A total of approximately 500-600 global licences have been issued 
each year during this period. See Technopolis, supra note 4, Appendix G, at 113-114 and Table 49 for a further 
breakdown. SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 19 only mentions “year on year increases”. 
169 COM(2016) 760 final, at 5. 
170 GRIP, supra note 7, at 19 and 20. 
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e.g. by specifying a common language and format or template. A more complex issue would 
be the centralisation of electronic access to general licence information.171 
 Even if suppliers can overcome difficulties experienced regarding documentation, 
before granting a general licence, a Member State may lay down conditions for registration 
prior to first use. 172  Therefore, Member States retain considerable discretion to define 
procedures for registration173 and de-registration, the latter not mentioned at all in the ICT. 
Again, a revised ICT could introduce further harmonisation regarding (de)registration 
requirements in order to ensure greater conformity of national approaches.174 
 In addition, whilst certain terms and conditions may protect legitimate public policy 
or security concerns, it is recalled from Section 2.1 above, that Member States continue to 
exercise discretion to determine all terms and conditions (Article 4(6) ICT). Post-
transposition practice indicates that Member States continue to rely on a diversity of terms 
and conditions most, if not all, of which appear to be disproportionate.175 Therefore, many of 
the criticisms predating the ICT regime continue to dominate under the current regime. This 
is a highly sensitive issue which Member States may perceive to be a matter falling within the 
discretion of national transfer policies. Notwithstanding, a revised ICT could seek to place 
certain explicit controls on licencing conditions e.g. to ensure that such terms and conditions 
are reasonable and proportionate to the transfer in question. Conversely, there has been some 
minimum harmonisation of information required of suppliers. The ICT provides that Member 
States must require suppliers to provide a range of information regarding the transfer.176 
However, beyond this minimum, Member States can also determine additional information 
that may be required, again, creating potential divergences in requirements imposed.177   
 
5. End-use controls 
As indicated in Section 2.2.2 above, concerns regarding the illicit export of transferred goods 
into rogue hands or conflict zones in third countries remain a prevalent issue. This has 
conditioned the ICT’s approach to transfers and provided the greatest scope for Member State 
discretion. Whilst ex ante controls are no longer possible through routine recourse to 
individual licences, even general licences retain the possibility for ex post controls ensuring 
that any export restriction on the defence good issued by the Member State of origin “follows 
the transferred good”.178 As this Section will demonstrate, it is with regard to export controls 
on transferred goods that the limits of the ICT’s harmonisation objectives are most apparent. 
 
 
171 GRIP, ibid., suggests a potential designated module for general licences on the CERTIDER website given 
that this is a central information point for certification, on which see Section 6 below. 
172 In the UK, for example, most OGELs require the exporter or trader to register before making use of licences.  
173 For a discussion of Member State registration practices under the ICT, see Technopolis, supra note 4, 
Appendix K, at 160-2 and 165-7. 
174 This is not expressly considered in the 2016 Evaluation Report COM(2016) 760 final 
175 For instance, GRIP identifies French practice in which general licences have incorporated technical clauses 
requiring either the supplier or recipient to make specific alterations to the product before shipping it as well as 
specific conditions attached to each category of product. See supra note 7, at 36-37. 
176 Member States must ensure that suppliers inform: recipients of the terms and conditions of the transfer 
licence (including limitations relating to end-use) (Article 8(1) ICT); within a reasonable time, the competent 
authorities of the originating Member State of their intention to use a general licence for the first time (Article 
8(2) ICT); and regularly check that suppliers keep detailed records of their transfers and determine the reporting 
requirements attached to the use of a licence (whether general, global or individual) (Article 8(2) ICT).  
177 Article 8(2) ICT. France has even reserved the right to conduct a preliminary interview with the supplier 
prior to transfer. See The impact of the ‘defence package’ Directives on European Defence, supra note 7, at 47 
fn. 88. On the application of information requirements, see Technopolis, supra note 4, Appendix K, at 163. 
178 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 41. 
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5.1. Limitations prior to transfer  
The ICT provides that Member States may not only include any limitations on exports to 
third countries in their transfer licences but may also “avail themselves”, i.e. positively take 
advantage, of the possibility to request end-use assurances including end-use certificates.179  
 As indicated in Section 2.2. above, the ICT does not intend to impact on Member 
States’ export control policies. Member State export measures are, however, to some extent, 
guided by the EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules 
governing military exports including a User Guide indicating best practice on the use of end-
user certificates (“EUCs”). However, end-use obligations and documentation currently vary 
greatly.180 Member States continue to require EUCs for individual and global licences.181 By 
contrast, Member States do not seem to require EUCs for transfers under a general licence 
but do generally include certain end-use restrictions such as non-re-export clauses, 
notification requirements, and clauses requiring components to be integrated. 182 Member 
States also impose a range of post-shipment controls such as delivery verification certificates 
(“DVCs”) and end-use monitoring.183 Ultimately, most Member States wish to maintain end-
use controls for both third country exports and intra-Union transfers. A significant reason is 
that Member States have pre-existing commitments under international control regimes 
concerning controls on end-use. Further, there is still a concern that export policies “vary 
quite widely” among Member States and which might constitute a risk where an importing 
Member State is an intermediary for export of transferred goods to a third country.184  
 At the very least, it is arguable that the ICT fails to sufficiently distinguish between 
intra-Union transfers which do not involve exports to third countries and those which do. For 
instance, Article 4(8) provides that Member States must not impose any export limitations for 
components where the recipient provides a declaration of use that the components are, or are 
to be, integrated into its own products and cannot at a later stage be transferred or exported as 
such, unless for the purposes of maintenance or repair.185 However, Member States may 
impose export limitations if the transfer of components is determined to be “sensitive” 
(Article 4(7) ICT). As indicated in Section 4.3.2 above, distinguishing between sensitive and 
non-sensitive transfers may prove difficult for the purposes of determining which licence a 
product should be subject to, let alone whether a transfer should be subject to export 
limitations.186 This raises further questions as to whether “sensitivity” is an effective criterion 
for application in this context.  
 Some Member States have indicated that controls on intra-Union transfers could be 
less restrictive than controls on exports. Whilst there is continued support for global and 
individual licence transfers to retain EUC requirements, a majority of Member States are in 
favour of their harmonisation. The difficulty at this stage is that Member States do not have a 
179 Article 4(6) ICT. This language is arcane and should be clarified in a subsequent revision of the ICT. 
180 GRIP, supra note 7, at 54-56. 
181 Ibid., at 55 and 60. 
182 GRIP, supra note 7, at 56-57 observes that a non-re-export clause is always included. Some clauses prohibit 
re-export without prior written authorisation by the original exporting country. Some also permit re-export 
without prior authorisation to certain allied third countries.  
183 Ibid., at 58-59. Several Member States do not require DVCs for transfers within the EU and, where required, 
these are only used under individual licences: ibid., at 58. 
184 GRIP, supra note 7, at 59. 
185 See also Recital 19 ICT. Member State practice indicates that general licences may incorporate integration 
clauses or declarations, or statements certifying to this effect and that certain Member States have used these 
sorts of statements as an alternative to the use of a non-re-export clause: GRIP, supra note 7, at 36. 
186 Whilst as indicated in Section 4.3.2., the ICT does not include any guidance regarding the sensitivity of 
products, Article 4(7) identifies two criteria for determining sensitivity: (a) the nature of the components and 
any end-use of the finished products which might give rise to concern; and (b) the significance of the 
components in relation to the products in which they are to be incorporated. 
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common vision of what form this would take and continue to express concern regarding the 
need for a case-by-case assessment in light of the diversity of end-use(r)s. 187  An open 
question is whether, in cases in which an end-user is a certified company receiving products 
under a general licence without prospect of export, any end-use guarantee should be 
considered disproportionate. In other words, certification itself might be considered the 
equivalent of an end-use guarantee.188 However, this equivalence may be questioned on the 
basis that, as will be discussed in Section 6 below, certification simply provides a 
determination that a company is reliable i.e. has capacity to observe export limitations on 
products transferred under a general licence.189 Certification is not a legal guarantee that 
specified goods will not be exported. Therefore, it remains unclear whether further revision to 
the certification regime could more clearly differentiate between intra-EU transfers which do 
not involve exports and intra-EU transfers which do involve exports to third countries. 
 
5.2. Limitations prior to export 
Corresponding to the limitations placed on transfers through the imposition of terms and 
conditions and end use obligations on licences regarding export, Article 10 ICT requires 
recipients of transferred products to declare to their competent authorities that they have 
complied with any export limitations attached to the licence, 190 including having obtained the 
required consent from the originating Member State. However, it is argued that because it is 
the recipient’s responsibility to declare and inform their authority, the ICT lacks any 
systematic means by which receiving Member States are routinely informed about relevant 
re-export conditions. 191  Consequently, the ICT fails to safeguard against the risk of 
unauthorised export in cases where recipients intentionally or inadvertently neglect to inform 
their authorities.192 The Commission had originally considered an IT traceability database 
that would track licences and export restrictions but this option was considered to be less 
cost-efficient than the information requirements finally adopted.193 
 Notwithstanding this uncertainty, Article 10 ICT is not the only available safeguard. 
Firstly, Member States may withdraw, suspend or limit the use of licences issued at any time 
on four grounds: protection of their essential security interests; public policy; public security; 
and non-compliance with licence terms and conditions: Article 4(9) ICT. Secondly, as 
indicated in Section 6 below, certification is one means of addressing export control 
concerns. Thirdly, a licencing Member State may provisionally suspend a general licence 
where there is a “serious risk” that a certified recipient will not comply with a licence 
condition, or that public policy, public security or its essential security could be affected: 
Article 15(1) and (2) ICT. Fourthly, the ICT contains provisions on customs procedures to 
ensure a further final check on exports: Article 11(1) ICT. Finally, Member States may lay 
down penalties for infringements, in particular, in the event of false or incomplete 
187 GRIP, supra note 7, at 60-61. This also means that harmonisation of post-shipment controls is currently 
“inconceivable”. 
188 Ibid., at 60 reporting that only one Member States expressed this opinion and that: “it should be underlined 
here that this understanding of the certification as an alternative to the EUC is not a shared interpretation among 
Member States. However, this issue should definitely be discussed among Member States.”  
189 The authors are grateful to Baudouin Heuninckx for this observation. 
190 Recitals 34, 35, 36 and Article 10 ICT. This corresponds with a prior obligation to ensure that suppliers 
inform recipients of end-use or export limitations. See Recital 31 and Article 8(1) ICT. 
191 Taylor, EC Defence Equipment Directives, Standard Note SN/IA/4640 3 June 2011, House of Commons 
Library, 20 citing at fn. 49 Committee on Arms Export Controls, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2009, HC 
178, Session 2008-09.  
192 Ibid. 
193 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 47. 
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information provided concerning compliance with export limitations.194 It is important that 
these provisions do not create divergent national practices on compliance and sanctioning. 
 
6. Certification  
It is recalled from Section 4.3.1 above that the ICT requires Member States to use general 
licences where the recipient is a certified undertaking: Article 5(2)(b) ICT. Thus, the 
introduction of a certification regime is the second fundamental innovation of the ICT.195 
Certification concerns the assessment of the reliability of a prospective recipient of defence-
related products under a general licence. Certification is conducted in the Member State in 
which the recipient is registered according to common criteria before any transfer takes place. 
The principal rationale is to ensure, in particular, the capacity of the recipient to comply with 
export limitations placed on transferred products.196 Certain Member States operated their 
own national certification systems before the ICT. 197  However, the need for common 
principles and mutual recognition required existing national processes to be overhauled. 
 
6.1. Optional certification and mutual recognition 
The legislator decided to establish a regime based on optional rather than mandatory 
certification.198 One significant argument against mandatory certification concerned the need 
for undertakings to weigh the costs and benefits in light of the manageable but still 
considerable certification costs.199 The ICT singles out the potential for certification to benefit 
transfers within a group of undertakings where members of the group are certified in their 
respective Member States of establishment.200At the very least, optional certification may 
incentivise Member States to grant general licences in light of the guarantees provided by 
certified reliability.201 It may also foster the conditions for mutual trust leading to mutual 
recognition of certificates attesting reliability. For instance, Article 9(6) ICT provides that 
Member States must recognise any certificates issued in another Member State. 
 
6.2. Competent authorities 
Article 9(1) ICT requires Member States to designate competent authorities to certify 
recipients on their territory under general licences published by other Member States. The 
fact that, prior to the ICT, departments other than defence (e.g. ministries of industry or 
economy) were often in charge of certification was an argument against the adoption of a 
transfer regime under the auspices of the European Defence Agency (EDA) which is seen as 
an agency of Member States’ ministries of defence.202 At present, the fact that certification is 
optional may reduce any appetite among Member States for the centralisation of certification 
under a unit within the Commission or the EDA, for example. However, the certification 
regime is already undergoing a process of centralisation. According to Article 9(8) ICT, 
Member States must publish and regularly update a list of certified recipients and inform the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the other Member States. Further, the 
Commission must make publicly available on its website a central register of recipients 
194 Article 16 ICT. See also Recital 38 ICT. 
195 The first innovation is the move from individual to general and global licenced, discussed in Section 4 above.   
196 Recital 33 and Article 9(2) ICT. See also 2016 Evaluation Report COM(2016) 760 final, at 4, first paragraph.  
197 French companies must obtain a “licence for manufacturing and trading” whilst UK companies are invited to 
implement a “compliance programme for exporters”: Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 37. 
198 Impact Assessment, ibid., at 26-27 and 37-40. 
199 Data collected during the consultation phase from stakeholders suggests annual costs of about €10,000.00 per 
company: Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 38-40. See also Recital 32 ICT. 
200 See Recital 3 ICT. 
201 Impact Assessment, supra note 6, at 40. 
202 Ibid. at 18. See also Transposition Report, supra note 7, at 10.  
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certified by Member States and has created a central register or this purpose.203 In the long-
term, the arguments for and against further centralisation under an EU institution could be 
explored as a means to build further trust beyond mutual recognition. 
 
6.3. Certification criteria, certification and publication 
As indicated, the ICT introduces what appears to be exhaustive common certification criteria 
to establish the recipient’s reliability. 204 The ICT also prescribes the minimum mandatory 
information to be contained in certificates (Article 9(3)(a)-(d) ICT). Member States may also 
provide that certificates contain further conditions relating to the provision of information 
required to verify compliance with the reliability criteria and concerning suspension or 
revocation of the certificate (Article 9(4) ICT). In addition, authorities must monitor the 
recipient’s compliance with the criteria and any further conditions at least every three 
years. 205   Finally, the validity of a certificate must not exceed five years (Article 9(3) 
paragraph 2 ICT). Therefore, notwithstanding common certification criteria, it is unclear 
whether Member States may: issue certificates for less than five years up to the maximum; 
differ in terms of the nature and level of information required to verify compliance; and 
monitor compliance more often than every three years. 
 To ensure further convergence in the applicable certification criteria, the Commission 
has published Recommendation 2011/24/EU206 setting out common certification guidelines; 
however, these may, in fact, create further diversity of national measures contrary to the 
ICT’s intended objectives. The guidelines not only amplify existing provisions but also leave 
scope for Member States to add further requirements, the proportionality of which might be 
questioned. It is not clear what has motivated a non-legally binding instrument; perhaps the 
most likely reason is the fact that certification is optional. Whatever the reason, the 
Recommendation was not specifically envisaged or enabled by the ICT. Section 6.5 below 
questions the continuing emphasis on such soft-law guidance in furthering harmonisation. 
 
6.4. Non-compliance 
If a competent authority determines that a certified recipient on its territory is no longer 
compliant, it must take “appropriate measures”, which may include suspension or revocation 
of the certificate: Article 9(4)(b) and (7) ICT. Uncertainty in determining what might 
constitute non-compliance and appropriate action may result in authorities simply opting for 
automatic revocation or suspension without considering less severe corrective measures. 
There is no provision in the ICT for Member States to achieve a relative degree of uniformity 
in approach, other than an obligation to inform the Commission and other Member States of 
the decision taken: Article 9(7) ICT. Recommendation 2011/24/EU provides some indication 
203 The Commission’s Register of Certified Defence-related Enterprises (CERTIDER) 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/certider/index.cfm [last visited 30 January 2017] provides 
information about enterprises certified under the ICT, contains a list of the competent national authorities 
designated to deal with certification, the list of certified enterprises, details about the certificates and links to 
relevant national legislation. According to GRIP, most but not all Member States refer to the EU’s list of 
certified recipients and several Member States specifically require the supplier to verify, on the EU website, 
whether the beneficiary holds a valid certificate (GRIP, supra note 7, at 33 indicating, however, that the UK 
authorities refer to a list of certified companies available on a UK website). It is submitted that a guidance note 
or a revised ICT could specify that all references should refer to the EU list of certified recipients. 
204 These include inter alia: experience of, and compliance with, export restrictions See Article 9(2)(a)-(f) ICT. 
205 Article 9(5) ICT. This provides an additional safeguard to that provided in Article 8(3) ICT which requires 
Member States to regularly check that suppliers keep detailed and complete records of their transfers. 
206 Commission Recommendation 2011/24/EU of 11 January 2011 on the certification of defence undertakings 
under Article 9 of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council simplifying terms and 
conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community [2011] OJ L11/62. The 
Recommendation was developed by the working group under the Committee procedure in Article 14 ICT. 
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as to how to proceed in assessing non-compliance, appropriate measures and determinations 
and time limits regarding the lifting, maintaining or revoking of suspensions.207 On issues 
that might be considered to fall within national procedural autonomy, principles of 
proportionality and effective judicial protection will need to provide a residual safeguard. 
 
6.5. Transposition, implementation, and impact  
According to the latest study, all Member States have defined their national certification 
systems in compliance with the ICT. 208  However, there has been a limited uptake in 
practice. 209  Firstly, companies, in particular, SMEs, express “serious doubts” about the 
benefits of certification given the time, risks, potential for intellectual property and security 
breaches and organisational and financial requirements necessary to prepare procedures, 
controls and audits for compliance.210 Secondly, there are potentially unknown costs and 
risks. For example, concern has been expressed regarding the certification criterion which 
requires a senior officer to be personally responsible for transfers and exports.211 These are 
exacerbated by the uncertain scope of application of general licences as well as the fact that it 
is not mandatory to publish licences and certifications in a common language such as 
English.212 Thirdly, in certain Member States a certificate may be limited in its scope e.g. to 
receive only certain categories of products. 213  Overall, only 55 enterprises have been 
certified, half of which are located in just two Member States.214 Further, only six per cent of 
applications for registration to use general licences relate to certified recipients. 215 
 The study supporting the Commission’s Evaluation Report recommended, and the 
2016 Evaluation Report considers, the future introduction of detailed implementation guides 
on certification based on the Recommendation.216 Equivocally, it is stated that these guides 
should be implemented in the form of a “non-mandatory accompanying procedure” that is 
“outside of the Directive” and which is to be preferred because it would take less time to 
negotiate than guidelines “linked directly to the directive”.217 Conversely, it is argued that 
further soft-law guidance unaccompanied by legal reform may have the opposite effect of 
leading to even more variable implementation. The co-existence of a legally binding 
instrument and a non-legally binding Recommendation need not compromise legal certainty 
if the latter is a principled amplification of the former. However, it should not be a substitute 
for inadequate legal provision in the ICT, which is arguably the case at present. The 2016 
Evaluation Report is accompanied by a further Recommendation regarding certified 
207 See, for example, Section 4(4.1) and Section 4(4.3.).  
208 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 35. See also: SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 21-22. COM(2016) 760 final, at 4, 
however, points out that one Member State “is yet to introduce a fully operable scheme for certifying defence 
enterprises” and that “[n]o complete information is available for all Member States” on this matter.  
209 GRIP, supra note 7, at 43 and COM(2016) 760 final, at 4, 5, 6, 9, and 11, which points out at 10 that 
certification is the only issue for which there was sufficient data.  
210 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 40 and 44; COM(2016) 760 final, at 6 and 9; SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 23. 
211 Thanks to Mr. Ian Bendelow for discussing the extent to which this is an issue within the export community 
as compliance programmes become increasingly sophisticated, although this was not expressed as a UK specific 
concern. See also GRIP, supra note 7, at 44 and the COM(2016) 760 final, at 6. 
212 According to GRIP, ibid., at 46, the administrative burdens and lack of information on general licences led 
some SMEs to use individual and global licences. Conversely, the latest report indicates that SMEs represent 63 
per cent of users of general licences for transfers to certified recipients. Technopolis, supra note 4, at Appendix 
G, at 117. On cost versus benefit generally, see Technopolis, ibid., at 35 and Appendix K, at 175. 
213 Ibid., Appendix K, at 153. 
214 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 173. See also COM(2016) 760 final, at 6 referring to Germany and France. Half 
of the Member States have no certified companies. According to SWD(2016) 398 final/2, at 23 the estimated 
number of certified enterprises is 53.      
215 Technopolis, ibid., at 114. 
216 Technopolis, supra note 4, at 81 and Appendix K, at 154 and COM(2016) 760 final, at 11. 
217 Technopolis, ibid., at 81 and Appendix K, at 154. 
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companies 218  discussed in Section 3 above. It also identifies proposals for guidance on 
certification in future, in addition to even softer approaches such as a handbook, outreach in 
network meetings, and expanding CERTIDER.219 However, whilst the Evaluation Report 
identifies the possibility of “revising the certification scheme” in the “longer run”, it provides 
no indication of its potential based on the current legal configuration of the scheme. 220  
Caution must be exercised against substantially extending the certification provisions given 
the ICT’s minimum harmonisation objective, the fact that certification is optional as well as 
the fact that the very purpose of certification is to reduce regulatory controls as a complement 
to general licences. Notwithstanding, clarification and slight expansion of the certification 
provisions could encourage an uptake in general licences.221 
 
7. Conclusions 
The ICT is an important weapon in the “Defence Package”, cutting through the fog of hazy 
claims that national security always justifies licencing. Whilst it is possible to debate the 
extent to which legitimate security risks arise from intra-EU transfers, they pose a 
substantially lesser risk than third country exports. The ICT’s main innovations are: (1) a 
transition away from individual licences towards general licences with defence products 
defined by the CML and subject to reduced ex ante controls; (2) certification of recipients; 
and (3) ex post controls on third country exports. This article has argued that an ambivalent 
approach to harmonisation has contributed significantly to the ICT’s limited operational 
effectiveness. The borderline between optional exemption from prior authorisation and 
mandatory licences is unclear as is the co-existence of legally and non-legally binding 
instruments. Moreover, Member States still determine their transfer and export control 
policies. Consequently, an overriding export control mentality is pervasive, as evidenced by 
continuing preference for individual licences and restrictively defined general licences. The 
certification regime is similarly unclear. Legal reform is necessary to achieve minimum 
harmonisation in preference to further harmonisation exclusively through soft law. 
 However, it is important to acknowledge the difficulties at present. The 2016 
evaluation, required by Article 17 ICT, only draws on a few years’ practice; the Commission 
was, perhaps, understandably reluctant to propose legal reform even though the evaluation is 
intended to provide the basis for a legislative proposal, if necessary.222 Therefore, the issues 
so far identified provide institutional learning for future revisions and should not be taken as 
an indication of its failure. More fundamentally, the exercise of EU competence renders the 
ICT susceptible to the same kinds of difficulties encountered when exercising any new 
competence for the first time: legislators and stakeholders must adapt, and mutual trust and 
recognition only grow over time. At the current stage of EU defence integration, intra-EU 
transfers are still considered to present security risks which legitimate certain controls. Over 
time, Member States need to ensure that licencing decisions are a true reflection of risk. 
Whilst a licence-free Europe may never be possible, the ICT, backed with institutional 
support, may lead to a quasi-Internal Market for defence goods with fewer licences.  
218 C(2016) 7728 final. 
219 COM(2016) 760 final, at 11 and 12. 
220 COM(2016) 760 final , at 12-13. 
221  Just one example would be clarity around the requirement for a designated officer to be “personally 
responsible”, which, at present is only likely to make authorities even more risk averse. 
222 COM(2016) 760 final, at 2: “only three years after the transposition deadline [it is] difficult to assess whether 
the long-term objectives of the Directive have been achieved.” See also SWD (2016) 398 final/2, at 6 and 13.    
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